The two closing windows of opportunity: The pivotal debate and the road to war
29 تشرين الأول 2024 12:44
The following article was written by Alain Akl:
On October 7, 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian militants shocked the world when they stormed Israeli territory in a bold and unexpected manner using creative means such as hang gliders and motocross bikes. The operation, code-named “Al-Aqsa Flood,” resulted in the killing of over 1,200 Israelis and the abduction of over 200 (“Al-Aqsa Flood,” 2024). Furthermore, the operation caused an internal conflict in Israel after PM Netanyahu and his government were accused of neglect and mishandling the situation. On a regional level, the conflict has developed into war against Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as a limited military conflict involving the Houthi militants in Yemen, after these factions targeted Israel using missiles—mostly Iranian-made. In addition, Iran launched two missile attacks against Israel. The first, in April 2024, was in retaliation to the Israeli bombing of an Iranian diplomatic complex in Syria, involving more than 300 projectiles (Diamond et al., 2024). As for the second, in October, it came as a retaliation for the killing of Hamas's leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah, and Iranian Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan (Gol, 2024).
The Nuclear Deal
Flashback to 2015, when the Obama administration—alongside China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union—signed a historical deal with Iran named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The most important points of this deal were as follows:
- Iran has the right to develop a peaceful nuclear program.
- The sanctions against Iran regarding its nuclear program should be lifted.
- A monitoring system is implemented to ensure the respect of this agreement.
- The accord limited the numbers and types of centrifuges Iran can operate, the level of uranium enrichment, as well as the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium (Robinson, 2023).
- Many of the JCPOA's restrictions on Iran's nuclear program have expiration dates. For example, after 10 years, centrifuge restrictions would be lifted, and after 15 years, so too would limits on the amount of low-enriched uranium Iran can possess (Robinson, 2023).
The Iranian leadership considered the deal a major triumph after years of suffering from sanctions that left the country in a dire social and economic situation. This even resulted in Iran halting the use of slogans such as “America is the great Satan,” a phrase commonly displayed on banners in Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Sanaa, and even Beirut, where Iranian proxies operated freely.
Then, the deal was “trumped!” In May 2018, President Trump announced the United States' withdrawal from the deal, calling it “horrible” (Bender et al., 2018), and reinstated aggressive sanctions against the Islamic Republic.
Iranian High Hopes
Afterward, with President Joseph Biden Jr. in office, the Ayatollah had high hopes about reviving the good old nuclear deal in its original format, or, at least, a new format that permits Iran to complete its nuclear program, removing the sanctions and further expanding its regional influence. But as the Arab saying goes: “Winds blow counter to what ships desire.”
The truth is that in high politics as well as in strategic military, decisions are made according to the circumstances at the time of the decision-making. In this context, when Biden came back to the White House—as president this time—new factors emerged in the Middle East, affecting the nuclear file:
- Iran's development of strategic missiles, especially ballistic ones.
- Threats against Saudi Arabia and the UAE by the Houthis, who attacked KSA's majority state-owned petroleum and natural gas company ARAMCO.
- Most importantly, the Abraham Accords, signed in 2020 during Trump's term in office, which normalized relations between Israel and four Arab countries: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.
- Serious negotiations aiming to normalize the relations between Israel and the most important country for Muslims in the Arab world and beyond: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
For all the reasons stated above, Biden's administration was not motivated to reinstate the “Obama deal” or negotiate a new deal with the Iranian government, especially with the rising tension between Biden and the young and motivated Saudi leader, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud due to multiple issues, including:
- Biden ended the American support of the Saudi-led military offensive against the Houthis in Yemen in February 2021 (Knickmeyer, 2021).
- Biden's harsh verbal attack against Saudi Arabia during his election campaign regarding the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
- Bin Salman's excellent ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and their collaboration in the “oil prices” war between the West and Russia have become especially significant following Russia‟s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
In addition, the Islamic Republic's rulers had to deal with—and violently suppress—a serious uprising that threatened the clerics' rule, especially since the revolt was driven by the cosmopolitan views of a globalized generation.
Iran’s Window of Opportunity
By the end of Biden’s term and before the pivotal debate on June 27, 2024, which led the Democratic Party to shift support from Biden to Vice President Kamala Harris, it was increasingly evident that Trump had the upper hand in the presidential race. Additionally, with normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia advancing, Iran’s “window of opportunity” to restore the old nuclear deal or negotiate a new one was closing. This generated a sense of urgency for Iran to prompt the U.S. to enter negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Tehran’s strategy was to destabilize multiple fronts, signaling to Washington that the Ayatollah had the means to threaten Israel, disrupt freedom of navigation, and challenge other American “red lines.” In essence, Iran showed its capacity to destabilize the Middle East and endanger American interests.
In response, a series of coordinated attacks by Iran and its proxies unfolded across multiple fronts. Hamas militants launched attacks on Israeli military and security posts, civilian homes, and public gatherings, using missiles, drones, and ground forces. The next day, Hezbollah initiated an attack on Israel, firing hundreds of missiles and sparking a large-scale Israeli operation in Lebanon targeting Hezbollah’s leadership and military infrastructure. The Houthis in Yemen began targeting civilian ships headed to Israel in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, violating critical U.S. red lines regarding navigation. This disruption raised shipping costs in one of the world’s busiest maritime zones and significantly impacted the global economy. Additionally, the Houthis launched several missile attacks on Israel, a key U.S. ally in the region.
Israel responded with extensive air strikes against Houthi forces in Yemen, severely damaging military sites like Al-Hudaydah Port and oil facilities, inflicting more harm than U.S.-led naval operations. Meanwhile, Iranian proxies in Iraq executed numerous attacks on U.S. forces stationed in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, as well as on Israel. Between October 2023 and August 2024, these proxies carried out 189 attacks on U.S. forces. In January 2024, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards claimed responsibility for an attack on Israel’s “spy headquarters” in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, an economically significant area for the U.S. and the West. That same month, Iran also engaged in tit-for-tat attacks with Pakistan, which retaliated shortly after.
Through these fronts, Iran successfully pressured the U.S. to engage in serious discussions that considered Tehran’s influence in any future regional deals, possibly paving the way for renewed negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
Israel’s Window of Opportunity
While Iran faced a narrowing window of opportunity, Israel encountered its own. Following the Al Aqsa Flood Operation and subsequent attacks on Israel from various fronts, Prime Minister Netanyahu grappled with mounting internal and external challenges. The opposition in Israel grew stronger, calling for the government to be held accountable and demanding political and legal consequences. The hostage situation, with Hamas holding Israeli citizens, placed additional pressure on Netanyahu, as families urged him to negotiate with Hamas.
Due to Hezbollah’s attacks on northern Israel, approximately 67,500 people were evacuated and displaced to southern regions, heightening governmental responsibility to ensure their return. Internationally, Israel’s relations with many Western allies were strained over allegations of IDF civilian casualties and excessive force in operations against Gaza and Lebanon. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared in July 2024 that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territories was illegal, adding to Israel’s diplomatic challenges. The growing rift between Israel and the UN culminated in Secretary-General Antonio Guterres being banned from entering Israel. Moreover, normalization talks with Saudi Arabia stalled.
Israel’s realization of its own closing opportunity was driven by the Biden-Trump debate, which marked a potential turning point for the Middle East. With Harris now the Democratic candidate, polls indicated she had a strong chance of winning the presidency, which unsettled Israeli leaders. While Trump’s support for Israel was unwavering, Tel Aviv harbored doubts about Harris’s stance, especially after her decision to skip Netanyahu’s congressional speech in July 2024. This sense of urgency led Israel to act decisively, launching an unprecedented campaign against Hezbollah before the U.S. elections.
Israel and Hezbollah’s Most Aggressive War
Israel’s short-term objective was to return displaced citizens to northern Israel, while its long-term goal was to neutralize Hezbollah’s threat. To achieve this, the IDF launched extensive air strikes, eliminating top Hezbollah leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, and causing significant destruction in Hezbollah-controlled regions, with thousands of fatalities in Lebanon. Israeli intelligence conducted operations targeting Hezbollah’s communication devices, disabling a large number of operatives. Despite these efforts, Hezbollah continued its daily attacks using Iranian missiles, which hindered displaced Israelis from returning to the north.
Recognizing the need for ground operations, the IDF mobilized four armored divisions to the Lebanon border, with special forces conducting reconnaissance.
End State and Scenarios
The ultimate goal of the ground campaign against Hezbollah remains uncertain. Although Tel Aviv described it as a limited incursion, the size of the mobilized IDF forces suggests a larger operation. Two primary scenarios emerge for the conflict’s resolution. The first, an enemy-based approach, involves a major assault across Lebanese territory to significantly reduce Hezbollah’s forces and capabilities, potentially resulting in a prolonged, costly war. The second, a land-based aim, would see the IDF establishing a buffer zone along a certain line to separate Hezbollah from northern Israel. However, this approach poses challenges: Hezbollah’s ballistic missiles can still reach Israel from northern Lebanon, and maintaining a buffer zone would require continuous IDF occupation.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of attacks from Hamas and missile strikes on multiple fronts, Israel regained the initiative, weakening Hamas and Hezbollah’s military capabilities and striking Houthi infrastructure in Yemen. Of the scenarios outlined, securing a buffer zone would necessitate an international agreement with Hezbollah or Iran, ensuring a safe return for Israelis and future security. However, if no such agreement is reached, the first scenario, aiming to dismantle Hezbollah’s capacities, appears more feasible.
The ongoing tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran suggest a competitive stance to gain leverage in future negotiations. Nonetheless, should Israel deem future negotiations disadvantageous, it might seize this narrowing window to initiate a large-scale offensive against Iran, potentially dragging the region into a broader conflict—a scenario American diplomats are keen to prevent. Despite the unreliable polls, the window of opportunity is closing for both Iran and Israel. The recent debate will either result in a Trump administration offering unconditional support to Israel or a Harris administration potentially curtailing Israel’s strategic freedom of maneuver, a critical concept in warfare.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian militants shocked the world when they stormed Israeli territory in a bold and unexpected manner using creative means such as hang gliders and motocross bikes. The operation, code-named “Al-Aqsa Flood,” resulted in the killing of over 1,200 Israelis and the abduction of over 200 (“Al-Aqsa Flood,” 2024). Furthermore, the operation caused an internal conflict in Israel after PM Netanyahu and his government were accused of neglect and mishandling the situation. On a regional level, the conflict has developed into war against Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as a limited military conflict involving the Houthi militants in Yemen, after these factions targeted Israel using missiles—mostly Iranian-made. In addition, Iran launched two missile attacks against Israel. The first, in April 2024, was in retaliation to the Israeli bombing of an Iranian diplomatic complex in Syria, involving more than 300 projectiles (Diamond et al., 2024). As for the second, in October, it came as a retaliation for the killing of Hamas's leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah, and Iranian Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan (Gol, 2024).
The Nuclear Deal
Flashback to 2015, when the Obama administration—alongside China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union—signed a historical deal with Iran named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The most important points of this deal were as follows:
- Iran has the right to develop a peaceful nuclear program.
- The sanctions against Iran regarding its nuclear program should be lifted.
- A monitoring system is implemented to ensure the respect of this agreement.
- The accord limited the numbers and types of centrifuges Iran can operate, the level of uranium enrichment, as well as the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium (Robinson, 2023).
- Many of the JCPOA's restrictions on Iran's nuclear program have expiration dates. For example, after 10 years, centrifuge restrictions would be lifted, and after 15 years, so too would limits on the amount of low-enriched uranium Iran can possess (Robinson, 2023).
The Iranian leadership considered the deal a major triumph after years of suffering from sanctions that left the country in a dire social and economic situation. This even resulted in Iran halting the use of slogans such as “America is the great Satan,” a phrase commonly displayed on banners in Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Sanaa, and even Beirut, where Iranian proxies operated freely.
Then, the deal was “trumped!” In May 2018, President Trump announced the United States' withdrawal from the deal, calling it “horrible” (Bender et al., 2018), and reinstated aggressive sanctions against the Islamic Republic.
Iranian High Hopes
Afterward, with President Joseph Biden Jr. in office, the Ayatollah had high hopes about reviving the good old nuclear deal in its original format, or, at least, a new format that permits Iran to complete its nuclear program, removing the sanctions and further expanding its regional influence. But as the Arab saying goes: “Winds blow counter to what ships desire.”
The truth is that in high politics as well as in strategic military, decisions are made according to the circumstances at the time of the decision-making. In this context, when Biden came back to the White House—as president this time—new factors emerged in the Middle East, affecting the nuclear file:
- Iran's development of strategic missiles, especially ballistic ones.
- Threats against Saudi Arabia and the UAE by the Houthis, who attacked KSA's majority state-owned petroleum and natural gas company ARAMCO.
- Most importantly, the Abraham Accords, signed in 2020 during Trump's term in office, which normalized relations between Israel and four Arab countries: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.
- Serious negotiations aiming to normalize the relations between Israel and the most important country for Muslims in the Arab world and beyond: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
For all the reasons stated above, Biden's administration was not motivated to reinstate the “Obama deal” or negotiate a new deal with the Iranian government, especially with the rising tension between Biden and the young and motivated Saudi leader, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud due to multiple issues, including:
- Biden ended the American support of the Saudi-led military offensive against the Houthis in Yemen in February 2021 (Knickmeyer, 2021).
- Biden's harsh verbal attack against Saudi Arabia during his election campaign regarding the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
- Bin Salman's excellent ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and their collaboration in the “oil prices” war between the West and Russia have become especially significant following Russia‟s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
In addition, the Islamic Republic's rulers had to deal with—and violently suppress—a serious uprising that threatened the clerics' rule, especially since the revolt was driven by the cosmopolitan views of a globalized generation.
Iran’s Window of Opportunity
By the end of Biden’s term and before the pivotal debate on June 27, 2024, which led the Democratic Party to shift support from Biden to Vice President Kamala Harris, it was increasingly evident that Trump had the upper hand in the presidential race. Additionally, with normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia advancing, Iran’s “window of opportunity” to restore the old nuclear deal or negotiate a new one was closing. This generated a sense of urgency for Iran to prompt the U.S. to enter negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Tehran’s strategy was to destabilize multiple fronts, signaling to Washington that the Ayatollah had the means to threaten Israel, disrupt freedom of navigation, and challenge other American “red lines.” In essence, Iran showed its capacity to destabilize the Middle East and endanger American interests.
In response, a series of coordinated attacks by Iran and its proxies unfolded across multiple fronts. Hamas militants launched attacks on Israeli military and security posts, civilian homes, and public gatherings, using missiles, drones, and ground forces. The next day, Hezbollah initiated an attack on Israel, firing hundreds of missiles and sparking a large-scale Israeli operation in Lebanon targeting Hezbollah’s leadership and military infrastructure. The Houthis in Yemen began targeting civilian ships headed to Israel in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, violating critical U.S. red lines regarding navigation. This disruption raised shipping costs in one of the world’s busiest maritime zones and significantly impacted the global economy. Additionally, the Houthis launched several missile attacks on Israel, a key U.S. ally in the region.
Israel responded with extensive air strikes against Houthi forces in Yemen, severely damaging military sites like Al-Hudaydah Port and oil facilities, inflicting more harm than U.S.-led naval operations. Meanwhile, Iranian proxies in Iraq executed numerous attacks on U.S. forces stationed in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, as well as on Israel. Between October 2023 and August 2024, these proxies carried out 189 attacks on U.S. forces. In January 2024, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards claimed responsibility for an attack on Israel’s “spy headquarters” in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, an economically significant area for the U.S. and the West. That same month, Iran also engaged in tit-for-tat attacks with Pakistan, which retaliated shortly after.
Through these fronts, Iran successfully pressured the U.S. to engage in serious discussions that considered Tehran’s influence in any future regional deals, possibly paving the way for renewed negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
Israel’s Window of Opportunity
While Iran faced a narrowing window of opportunity, Israel encountered its own. Following the Al Aqsa Flood Operation and subsequent attacks on Israel from various fronts, Prime Minister Netanyahu grappled with mounting internal and external challenges. The opposition in Israel grew stronger, calling for the government to be held accountable and demanding political and legal consequences. The hostage situation, with Hamas holding Israeli citizens, placed additional pressure on Netanyahu, as families urged him to negotiate with Hamas.
Due to Hezbollah’s attacks on northern Israel, approximately 67,500 people were evacuated and displaced to southern regions, heightening governmental responsibility to ensure their return. Internationally, Israel’s relations with many Western allies were strained over allegations of IDF civilian casualties and excessive force in operations against Gaza and Lebanon. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared in July 2024 that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territories was illegal, adding to Israel’s diplomatic challenges. The growing rift between Israel and the UN culminated in Secretary-General Antonio Guterres being banned from entering Israel. Moreover, normalization talks with Saudi Arabia stalled.
Israel’s realization of its own closing opportunity was driven by the Biden-Trump debate, which marked a potential turning point for the Middle East. With Harris now the Democratic candidate, polls indicated she had a strong chance of winning the presidency, which unsettled Israeli leaders. While Trump’s support for Israel was unwavering, Tel Aviv harbored doubts about Harris’s stance, especially after her decision to skip Netanyahu’s congressional speech in July 2024. This sense of urgency led Israel to act decisively, launching an unprecedented campaign against Hezbollah before the U.S. elections.
Israel and Hezbollah’s Most Aggressive War
Israel’s short-term objective was to return displaced citizens to northern Israel, while its long-term goal was to neutralize Hezbollah’s threat. To achieve this, the IDF launched extensive air strikes, eliminating top Hezbollah leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, and causing significant destruction in Hezbollah-controlled regions, with thousands of fatalities in Lebanon. Israeli intelligence conducted operations targeting Hezbollah’s communication devices, disabling a large number of operatives. Despite these efforts, Hezbollah continued its daily attacks using Iranian missiles, which hindered displaced Israelis from returning to the north.
Recognizing the need for ground operations, the IDF mobilized four armored divisions to the Lebanon border, with special forces conducting reconnaissance.
End State and Scenarios
The ultimate goal of the ground campaign against Hezbollah remains uncertain. Although Tel Aviv described it as a limited incursion, the size of the mobilized IDF forces suggests a larger operation. Two primary scenarios emerge for the conflict’s resolution. The first, an enemy-based approach, involves a major assault across Lebanese territory to significantly reduce Hezbollah’s forces and capabilities, potentially resulting in a prolonged, costly war. The second, a land-based aim, would see the IDF establishing a buffer zone along a certain line to separate Hezbollah from northern Israel. However, this approach poses challenges: Hezbollah’s ballistic missiles can still reach Israel from northern Lebanon, and maintaining a buffer zone would require continuous IDF occupation.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of attacks from Hamas and missile strikes on multiple fronts, Israel regained the initiative, weakening Hamas and Hezbollah’s military capabilities and striking Houthi infrastructure in Yemen. Of the scenarios outlined, securing a buffer zone would necessitate an international agreement with Hezbollah or Iran, ensuring a safe return for Israelis and future security. However, if no such agreement is reached, the first scenario, aiming to dismantle Hezbollah’s capacities, appears more feasible.
The ongoing tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran suggest a competitive stance to gain leverage in future negotiations. Nonetheless, should Israel deem future negotiations disadvantageous, it might seize this narrowing window to initiate a large-scale offensive against Iran, potentially dragging the region into a broader conflict—a scenario American diplomats are keen to prevent. Despite the unreliable polls, the window of opportunity is closing for both Iran and Israel. The recent debate will either result in a Trump administration offering unconditional support to Israel or a Harris administration potentially curtailing Israel’s strategic freedom of maneuver, a critical concept in warfare.